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I. MODEL
A. Problem Formulation
Suppose there are n goods which are each infinitely divisible; let L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} be
the set of goods. There is only a limited amount of each good; the maximum amount of
lj available is denoted by clj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and is always nonnegative. Furthermore,
we have m individuals (set of individuals denoted by I) partitioned into |G| disjoint
groups; the set of groups is G = {g1, g2, . . . , g|G|}. Each group g ∈ G is specified by
{I(g),L(g)}, where I(g) ⊆ I is the set of individuals in g, and L(g) ⊆ L is the set of goods
requested by members of the group. Let Il ⊆ I be the set of individuals that request
good l, and also assume that I
(g)
l = Il ∩ I
(g) is the set of all individuals of group g
requesting good l ∈ L(g). Moreover, let Gl ⊆ G designate the set of groups g for which
l ∈ L(g).
Consider a specific individual i, where i ∈ g and g ∈ G. Let Li = {li1, li2 , . . . , li|Li|} ⊆ L
be the subset of goods which may be requested by individual i (so L(g) =
⋃
i∈I(g) Li). For
each individual, the subset Li is known and fixed in advance. The amount of goods actu-
ally demanded by the individual is given by the demand vector xi = (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xi|Li|),
where xik is the amount of good lik requested by i, for k = 1, 2, . . . , |Li|. For a given
demand xi, the utility to individual i is the function Ui : R
|Li| → R, which is monotone1,
Preliminary Draft, April, 2010 DRAFT
2concave, and satisfies Ui(0) = 0 and Ui(z) = −∞ if any entry of z is negative. Also, call
x = (x1, . . . ,xm) to be the overall demand of all individuals.
Suppose that we have a designer (e.g., the government) who wants to design a
mechanism to maximize the social welfare
∑m
i=1[Ui(xi) − ti(xi)]. Here, ti : R
|Li| → R
consist of taxation policies on individuals i, i = 1, . . . , m, and is to be designed. We
consider a scenario where the role of the designer is purely wealth redistributionary;
there is no net tax collected, so
∑m
i=1 ti(xi) = 0. Then we can write the tax-explicit social
welfare maximization problem as the following:
maximize
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xi)− ti(xi)]
subject to
m∑
i=1
ti(xi) = 0∑
g∈G
max
i∈I
(g)
l
xil ≤ cl, ∀l ∈ L
, (1)
where the optimization variables are xi ∈ R
|Li| for all i ∈ I. The resulting taxes charged
to (or accrued by) the individuals are denoted by the vector t = (t1, t2, . . . , tm), with ti
being shorthand for ti(xi).
Definition 1. A taxation scheme t = (t1, t2, . . . , tm) is budget-balanced if the sum of taxes
is zero; i.e.,
∑m
i=1 ti = 0.
Notice that the preceding welfare maximization problem (1) gives the same solution
as the following social welfare maximization problem (with no explicit taxation term):
maximize
m∑
i=1
Ui(xi)
subject to
∑
g∈G
max
i∈I
(g)
l
xil ≤ cl, ∀l ∈ L
. (2)
We expand the constraints of problem (2), in order to aid in the decomposition.
For each good l ∈ L, define the vector pil = (π
(1)
l , π
(2)
l , . . . , π
(|G|)
l ) as a selection of
individuals—one individual from each group—such that every selected individual may
request good l. That is, π
(g)
l denotes a particular individual such that π
(g)
l ∈ I
(g)
l , for every
g ∈ G. If I
(g)
l = ∅ (i.e., no individuals in group g requests good l), then we can ignore
1Actually, we do not need Ui(xi) to be monotonic, as that is not necessary for our analysis.
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3the π
(g)
l entry. (We will see shortly how this is incorporated when solving our problem.)
Then for each good l, the set of all possible combinations of selecting individuals (who
might demand l) from the groups is Πl = {(π
(1)
l , π
(2)
l , . . . , π
(|G|)
l ) | π
(g)
l ∈ I
(g)
l , ∀g ∈ G}.
Thus |Πl| =
∏
g∈G
|I
(g)
l |. For later convenience, we denote P =
∑
l∈L
|Πl|.
Equivalent to problem (2), we obtain the following problem:
maximize
m∑
i=1
Ui(xi)
subject to
∑
g∈G
x
π
(g)
l
≤ cl, ∀l ∈ L, ∀pil ∈ Πl
. (3)
We call problem (3) the primal problem. The contribution of this paper is a simple
budget-balanced taxation scheme which is simple to implement and achieves the max-
imal social welfare.
In fact, we have the following assumptions over the information structure:
(A1) The utility function of each individual will be his own private information and
need not be known by the designer.
(A2) The designer does know the set of requested goods Li for each individual i.
Moreover, the set Li is fixed.
(A3) The individuals are price takers.
II. TAˆTONNEMENT PROCESS
A. Dual Decomposition
We consider a decomposition of the welfare maximization problem (3). From this,
we will be able to derive the taxation policy which satisfies the tax-explicit welfare
maximization problem (1) with the stated assumptions.
Let us consider the Lagrangian of (3), where the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the capacity constraint
∑
g∈G xπ(g)
l
≤ cl is denoted by pl,pil , for each good l ∈ L and each
selector pil ∈ Πl. Let p ∈ R
P be the vector which consists of all the Lagrange multipliers.
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4The Lagrangian is
L(x,p) =
m∑
i=1
Ui(xi) +
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
pl,pil
[
cl −
∑
g∈G
x
π
(g)
l
]
(4)
=
m∑
i=1
Ui(xi)−
m∑
i=1
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pilxil +
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
pl,pilcl (5)
=
m∑
i=1
[
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
( ∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
)
xil
]
+
∑
l∈L
(∑
pil∈Πl
pl,pil
)
cl (6)
=
m∑
i=1
[
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
pilxil
]
+
∑
l∈L
plcl, (7)
where we let
pl =
∑
pil∈Πl
pl,pil (8)
pil =
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil . (9)
If we define g(p) = maxx L(x,p), then the dual problem to (3) is
minimize g(p)
subject to p ≥ 0
, (10)
with variable p. If strong duality holds (which can be checked using a constraint
qualification such as Slater’s condition [1]), then the solution to the dual problem can
be used to recover the solution to the primal welfare maximization problem.
We decompose g(p) so that g(p) =
∑m
i=1 gi(p) +
∑
l∈L plcl, where
gi(p) = max
xi
[
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
pilxil
]
(11)
for each individual i ∈ I. Then each individual i can find gi(p) as the optimal value of
the following individual subproblem:
maximize Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
pilxil (12)
(for fixed p and with variable xi ∈ R
|Li|). We denote x¯i = (x¯i1 , . . . , x¯i|Li|) to be the
solution to the individual subproblem for individual i. We can readily determine that
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5x¯i will also be the solution to
maximize Ui(xi)−
[∑
l∈Li
pilxil − γp,i
]
, (13)
(where the variable is xi ∈ R
|Li|), as long as γp,i is constant with respect to xi.
We can now directly solve the dual problem (10) by solving the following master
problem (with variable p ∈ RP ):
minimize
m∑
i=1
gi(p) +
∑
l∈L
plcl
subject to p ≥ 0
. (14)
The mechanism designer can solve the master problem by updating p using the pro-
jected subgradient method [2]. A subgradient (with respect to p) of the objective function
is s ∈ RP , where the elements are given by
sl,pil = cl −
∑
i∈pil
x¯il . (15)
Thus, at each iteration, p is updated according to
pl,pil :=
[
pl,pil − β
[
cl −
∑
i∈pil
x¯il
]]+
, ∀l ∈ L, ∀pil ∈ Πl, (16)
where [z]+ denotes the positive part of z, or that [z]+ = max{0, z}.
Many techniques exist for choosing the positive step size parameter β.2 Suffice to say
is that for small enough β, convergence to the optimum of the master problem (14) is
guaranteed.
The required computations are highly decentralized. Given pl,pil where l ∈ Li and
i ∈ pil, each individual i computes his own subproblem to find x¯i. The individual
receives the pl,pil for which l ∈ Li and i ∈ pil, and uses that to determine his current
demand x¯i according to (12). On the other hand, each (l,pil) (i.e., each pairing of good l
and selected individuals pil) can compute its own price pl,pil , given the relevant demands
2In this work, we have assumed that the subgradient update step sizes are chosen appropriately so that the
respective algorithms converge. We refer the reader to [3] for a discussion of the rates of convergence of certain step
sizes, and to [2] for additional conditions on the step size β which guarantee that the optimal values of the master
dual problems will be approached. A more thorough study of the convergence properties of subgradient methods
using both constant and non-constant step size rules (generally using diminishing step sizes) can also be found in
[4]. For our algorithms, different step size rules may be helpful for speeding up the rate of convergence.
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6x¯il of individuals i ∈ pil for good l. Very little information needs to be exchanged
between the designer and the individuals: From the designer (or from the “goods”),
parts of p are sent to the appropriate individuals; from the individuals, the demands
x¯il are sent back to the designer (or to the appropriate “goods” Li and the appropriate
group selectors). In fact, each (l,pil) does not need to be explicitly told the x¯il from each
individual individually; it only needs to measure its total demand in order to obtain∑
i∈pil
x¯il .
B. Achieving Budget-Balance
The form of the individual subproblem (12) suggests a taxation method which would
be amenable towards achieving the global optimum of the dual problem (10). As dis-
cussed, an individual i solving a subproblem of the form (13) would be optimal at the
same demand solution x¯i as that from (12). Thus, let us consider tax policies of the
form tp,i(xi) =
∑
l∈Li
pilxil − γp,i.
Consider the choice of γp,i =
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
|Gl|−1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl . This choice of γp,i is
constant with respect to the variable xi of individual i’s subproblem. The tax policy is
then
tp,i(xi) =
∑
l∈Li
pilx¯il −
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
|Gl| − 1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl (17)
=
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil x¯il −
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
|Gl| − 1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl . (18)
We assume that |Gl| > 1 for all l ∈ L. If |Glˆ| = 1 for some good lˆ ∈ L, then we can a
priori set the tax rate on the good to be zero, i.e., plˆ,pi
lˆ
= 0, so that the tax and demand
for this good will not affect the overall budget-balance. Even with such restrictions, our
method will still produce the optimal social welfare maximizing solution.
Lemma 1. The tax policy given in (18) is budget-balanced when xi = x¯i for all i ∈ I. That
is,
∑m
i=1 tp,i(x¯i) = 0.
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7Proof.
m∑
i=1
tp,i(x¯i) =
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
∑
i∈pil

pl,pilx¯il − pl,pil|Gl| − 1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl

 (19)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
pl,pil

∑
i∈pil
x¯il −
1
|Gl| − 1
∑
i∈pil
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl

 (20)
= 0, (21)
where (21) holds because for every good l ∈ L and every selector pil ∈ Πl, we have∑
i∈πl
x¯il −
1
|Gl|−1
∑
i∈pil
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl = 0.
For goods lˆ ∈ L such that |Glˆ| = 1, if we initialize plˆ,pi
lˆ
= 0 for all pi lˆ ∈ Πlˆ, then
the subgradient update (16) will not deviate away from plˆ,pi
lˆ
= 0 as long as the only
demand for lˆ is feasible. The taxation policy may be slightly off-balance when plˆ,pi
lˆ
> 0
for some pi lˆ ∈ Πlˆ, but the subgradient update (and resulting tax) will eventually force
the singular individual in Ilˆ to return his demand to feasibility, which will also return
plˆ,pi
lˆ
= 0 and restore budget-balance.
One cause for concern might be how individual i would obtain knowledge of the
optimal solutions x¯j for the other individuals j, j 6= i, in order to compute the “constant”
term in the tax policy. This can be decreed by the designer after every individual has
indicated his demand. Because
argmax
xi
[
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
pilxil
]
= argmax
xi
[
Ui(xi)−
[∑
l∈Li
pilxil − γp,i
]]
, (22)
the individual could first optimize for Ui(xi) −
∑
l∈Li
pilx
i
l to find its own x¯i. This x¯i
would then be sent to the mechanism designer, who then computes the offset γp,i =∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
|Gl|−1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl for every individual i and using the current p. The final
tax for individual i can be calculated by taking the initial
∑
l∈Li
pilx¯il and then subtracting
the offset term γp,i which the designer tells to him. Each individual’s tax will then be
as in (18) and the total tax from all individuals will be zero.
This procedure will be made more clear in the taˆtonnement process in the next section.
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8C. Taˆtonnement Process
The preceding decomposition can be implemented using a tax-based approach, as
shown in Algorithm 1. The taxation policy is explicitly given, and the individual and
master problems are clearly specified. Here, ǫ > 0 is some appropriately-chosen conver-
gence threshold, and the norm ‖ · ‖ in the convergence criterion is the ℓ2-norm.
Algorithm 1 Taˆtonnement process for budget-balanced welfare maximization.
1: Initialize p to p(0) = 0. Set k := 0.
2: repeat
3: Using the current p = p(k), the designer tells individual i ∈ I the taxation weights
for demanding particular goods; that is, the individual is told pil (which equals∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil) for all l ∈ Li. The linear part of the tax policy for i is then
tˆp,i(z) =
∑
l∈Li
pilzl.
4: For individual i, solve
maximize Ui(xi)− tˆp,i(xi)
for variable xi ∈ R
|Li|. Note that this is the same individual subproblem as in (12).
Set the solution as x¯i. Send the current solution x¯i to the designer.
5: The designer updates p using
pl,pil(k + 1) =
[
pl,pil(k)− β
(k)
[
cl −
∑
i∈pil
x¯il
]]+
for each good l ∈ L and each combination of individuals pil ∈ Πl.
6: Update k := k + 1. Set p := p(k).
7: until ‖p(k + 1)− p(k)‖ < ǫ
8: The designer computes γp,i,x¯−i =
∑
l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
pl,pil
|Gl|−1
∑
j∈pil
j 6=i
x¯jl for every individ-
ual i ∈ I. Each individual i is charged the tax
tp,i,x¯−i(x¯i) = tˆp,i(x¯i)− γp,i,x¯−i .
9: Set x⋆i := x¯i for all i ∈ I. Set p
⋆ := p.
Lemma 2. At iteration k + 1, the demand allocation x⋆ found from Algorithm 1 is no more
than ǫ
β(k)
-infeasible.
Proof. Consider a good l ∈ L for which the demand is infeasible for some selection of
individuals pil, i.e.,
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il > cl. From the subgradient update, step 5, we know that
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90 ≤ −β(k)
(
cl −
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il
)
≤ pl,pil(k + 1)− pl,pil(k). Then the following inequalities hold:
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il − cl ≤
1
β(k)
(pl,pil(k + 1)− pl,pil(k)) (23)
=
1
β(k)
|pl,pil(k + 1)− pl,pil(k)|
≤
1
β(k)
‖p(k + 1)− p(k)‖ (24)
<
1
β(k)
ǫ. (25)
Thus,
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il < cl +
ǫ
β(k)
.
The implication of the preceding lemma is that we can choose the convergence cri-
terion ǫ to be arbitrarily small, in order to obtain guarantees on the feasibility of our
solution. In order to exactly guarantee feasibility, we can also run the algorithm until
the p updates are no longer changing—at which point ||p(k + 1) − p(k)|| = 0, so that∑
i∈pil
x⋆il ≤ cl by (24).
D. Convergence of Taˆtonnement Process
We now show that this particular decomposition and specified tax policy converges
to the solution of the welfare maximization problem.
Lemma 3. The sequence of iterates p(k) will converge to within ǫ/2 of the true optimal solution.
At this point, Algorithm 1 will terminate, as the convergence criterion ‖p(k + 1)− p(k)‖ < ǫ
will have been reached.
Proof. By strong duality between the primal problem (3) and the dual problem (10),
and by complementary slackness with respect to the primal inequality constraints, we
know that the primal optimal solution x˜ and dual optimal solution p˜ satisfy p˜l,pil =[
p˜l,pil − β
[
cl −
∑
i∈pil
x˜il
]]+
for all l ∈ L and all pil ∈ Πl, for any β > 0. We consider this
to be a fixed point of the subgradient iteration for p.
¿From [2, Proposition 6.3.1], we know that if our step sizes β(k) satisfy
0 < β(k) <
2(g(p(k))− g(p˜))
‖s(k)‖2
, (26)
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then each iterate p(k) will satisfy
‖p(k + 1)− p˜‖ < ‖p(k)− p˜‖, (27)
i.e., the subgradient updates form a contractive map between the iterate and an opti-
mum. This arises from the inequality
‖p(k + 1)− p˜‖2 ≤ ‖p(k)− p˜‖2 − 2β(k)(g(p(k))− g(p˜)) + (β(k))2‖s(k)‖2, (28)
which depends on the definition of the subgradient. Furthermore, this inequality implies
g(p(k + 1))− g(p˜) ≤
‖p(0)− p˜‖2 +
∑k
i=0(β
(i))2‖s(i)‖2
2
∑k
i=0 β
(i)
. (29)
If we choose step sizes β(k) which are square-summable but not summable, i.e.,
∑∞
k=0 β
(k) =
∞ and
∑∞
k=0(β
(k))2 < ∞, then the dual objective will converge to its optimum. For
example, we could choose β(k) = β(0)/k, where the initial step size β(0) is chosen to
ensure (26) for all iterations k. Even if the step sizes are not chosen this way, as long as
the step sizes are square-summable, then we can guarantee a bound on the difference
from the optimum by using (29).
The contractive map tells us that there exists some time step kˆ such that ‖p(kˆ)− p˜‖ <
ǫ/2. Moreover, ‖p(kˆ + 1) − p˜‖ < ǫ/2, so the value of the dual variable p(kˆ + 1) is also
within ǫ/2 of the optimal dual solution. Then ‖p(kˆ + 1) − p(kˆ)‖ < ǫ. The convergence
criterion for p has been reached, and this occurs when the dual iterate is sufficiently
close to the optimal dual solution.
Theorem 4. Assuming that strong duality holds, Algorithm 1 converges to the global optimum
of the welfare maximization problem (3).
Proof. The subgradient update in step 5 will converge to the optimal solution of the
dual problem (10), which is also the optimal solution of the master dual problem (14).
We know that at convergence, the solutions x⋆i , which are the maximizers from step 4
when p = p⋆, are the same as the maximizers for the subproblems (12) (for every i ∈ I).
By strong duality, the dual value at the solution to (10) is the same as the primal optimal
value for (3). Because the objective function for each subproblem (12) is strictly concave,
the optimal solution for each subproblem is unique, and so x⋆i for all i ∈ I is the solution
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to the primal problem (3). Thus the algorithm gives the demand allocation which finds
the maximum social welfare.
E. Alternative Taxation Policy for Achieving Budget-Balance (at Equilibrium)
At convergence of Algorithm 1 (when each individual i demands an allocation of x⋆i ),
if we instead use an alternative tax policy of
τp⋆,i(z) =
∑
l∈Li
(pil)
⋆
[
zl −
1
|Gl|
cl
]
, (30)
then this tax policy will be budget-balanced. Here, p⋆ is the optimal dual solution given
at algorithm convergence. Budget-balance can be shown by computing the sum of taxes:
m∑
i=1
τp⋆,i(x
⋆
i ) =
m∑
i=1
∑
l∈Li
(pil)
⋆
[
x⋆il −
1
|Gl|
cl
]
(31)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
i:l∈Li
(pil)
⋆x⋆il −
∑
l∈L
∑
i:l∈Li
1
|Gl|
(pil)
⋆cl (32)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
i:l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
p⋆l,pilx
⋆
il
−
∑
l∈L
∑
i:l∈Li
∑
pil∈Πl:i∈pil
1
|Gl|
p⋆l,pilcl (33)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
∑
i∈pil
p⋆l,pilx
⋆
il
−
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
∑
i∈pil
1
|Gl|
p⋆l,pilcl (34)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
p⋆l,pil
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il −
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
p⋆l,pilcl
(∑
i∈pil
1
|Gl|
)
(35)
=
∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
p⋆l,pil
[∑
i∈pil
x⋆il − cl
]
, (36)
where (36) holds because
∑
i∈pil
1
|Gl|
= 1 for all l ∈ L. By Theorem 4, each x⋆i is the demand
allocation which globally maximizes the social welfare. Because the difference
∑
i∈pil
xil−
cl is the constraint associated with the Lagrange multiplier pl,pil , by complementary
slackness [1], the product p⋆l,pil
[∑
i∈pil
x⋆il − cl
]
= 0 for every l ∈ L and pil ∈ Πl. Thus,∑
l∈L
∑
pil∈Πl
p⋆l,pil
[∑
i∈pil
x⋆il − cl
]
= 0, and the tax policy is budget-balanced.
When Algorithm 1 converges, we know that p⋆ satisfies the complementary slackness
conditions. This tells us that if a particular good lˆ ∈ L under combination pi lˆ is not fully
demanded, i.e., when
∑
i∈pi
lˆ
x⋆i
lˆ
< clˆ, then from complementary slackness we know that
p⋆
lˆ,pi
lˆ
= 0. This means that any individual i ∈ pi lˆ, where lˆ ∈ Li, could increase his demand
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xi
lˆ
without any taxation penalty with regards to the particular combination pilˆ; however,
he will not do so as that would decrease his own utility (recall that every individual is
already at his optimal point x⋆i ). In fact, if every utility function were strictly increasing,
then all of the maximum good demand constraints would be satisfied with equality.
This is because every individual would always want to increase his demands—thereby
increasing his utility as long as that good has no tax penalty—until goods can no longer
be provided to him.
We have discussed that imposing a tax policy of τp,i(z) =
∑
l∈Li
pil
[
zl −
1
|Gl|
cl
]
for every
individual i will lead to a solution which is budget-balanced at optimality. However,
any tax policy of the form τp,i(z) =
∑
l∈Li
pilzl − γp,i, where γp,i is the constant offset
term in the policy, is acceptable for budget balance—as long as
∑m
i=1 γp,i =
∑
l∈L plcl (so
that the complementary slackness budget-balance argument still holds). Each individual
may be given a different constant offset for its required tax, but the algorithm will still
converge to the same solution x⋆ since the offsets do not change the demand solutions
of the individual subproblems (12). It may be useful to consider other forms for γp,i to
satisfy some other desired property (for example, some notion of fairness). For example,
one approach would be to consider constant offsets of the form γp,i = θi
∑
l∈L plcl, where∑m
i=1 θi = 1.
F. Discussion
Definition 2. Given a demand x, for any good l ∈ L and group selectors pil,pi
′
l ∈ Πl, we call
pil ≻ pi
′
l if
∑
i∈pil
xil >
∑
i∈pi′
l
xil . (37)
Consequently, define the set Πmaxl as
Πmaxl = {pil ∈ Πl | pil ≻ pi
′
l for all pi
′
l ∈ Πl such that pi
′
l 6= pil}. (38)
For a particular good l, an element of Πmaxl is denoted by pi
max
l .
From the taˆtonnement process specified in section II-C, the following observations
can be made at equilibrium:
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(O1) Suppose the utility functions are monotone. Then for any l ∈ L and pimaxl ∈
Πmaxl , we have
∑
i∈pimax
l
x⋆i − cl = 0. Thus for all pi
max
l ∈ Π
max
l and pil ∈ Πl \Π
max
l ,
we obtain the following properties:
•
∑
i∈pil
x⋆il < cl.
• p⋆l,pil = 0.
• p⋆l =
∑
pi
max
l
∈Πmax
l
p⋆l,pimax
l
.
• For all j ∈ Il, if j 6∈ pi
max
l for all pi
max
l , then (p
j
l )
⋆ = 0.
• For all j ∈ Il, if there exists π
max
l ∈ Π
max
l where j ∈ π
max
l , then (p
j
l )
⋆ =∑
pi
max
l
∈Πmax
l
:j∈pimax
l
p⋆l,pimax
l
.
(O2) Consider l ∈ L and suppose that |Πmaxl | = 1, i.e., Π
max
l = {pi
max
l }, then the
following hold:
• p⋆l = (p
i
l)
⋆ = (pjl )
⋆ for any i, j ∈ pimaxl .
• For good l, the problem becomes a market problem for the individuals who
are in pimaxl .
• For any j ∈ Il \ {pi
max
l }, (p
j
l )
⋆ = 0.
III. CONCLUSION
We have presented a simple taˆtonnement process based on a decomposition method
which is simple to implement and achieves the maximal social welfare, under the
assumption that the utility function of each [price-taking] individual will be his own
private information and need not be known by the designer. At each iteration, very
little information needs to be exchanged among the individuals in order to achieve the
optimal allocation. Furthermore, the given taˆtonnement process is always balanced at
equilibrium and off equilibrium.
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